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In the century and a quarter between the framing of the federal Con-
stitution in 1787 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the United 
States evolved from a struggling commercial republic on the margins 
of Europe into one of the most powerful industrial nations in the world. 
Accompanying the rise of the United States to world power was a 
comparable transformation in the informational environment. The pe-
riod witnessed an unprecedented expansion in printing and publishing, 
the emergence of information-intensive industries such as credit re-
porting and life insurance, and the elaboration of major innovations in 
science, technology, and education. Each of these developments could 
furnish the theme for an essay on the role of information during the 
"long nineteenth century" that stretched from 1787 to 1914. 
Yet there was one development that may well have been the most 
fundamental. This was the recasting of the facilities for transmitting 
information cheaply, reliably, and on a regular basis throughout the 
country and around the world. Challenged by the size of the territory 
to be spanned, emboldened by a highly competitive institutional set-
ting, and inspired by an irrepressible popular demand for more and 
better information, government administrators, business leaders, and 
ordinary Americans joined together in a grand collaborative project 
that would have been unimaginable in any prior age. The central 
institutions in the information infrastructure during this period—the 
Post Office Department, the Railway Mail Service, Western Union, 
and the Bell System—may seem rudimentary today. Yet, at the time, 
they played a major role in U.S. business and public life. 
The first communications revolution of the long nineteenth century 
began in the 1760s, with the emergence of an organized opposition to 
the Crown, and culminated in the 1820s with the establishment of a 
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national postal network. The second began in the 1840s, with the 
expansion of the railroad and the commercialization of the telegraph, 
and culminated in the 1910s with the completion of a national tele-
phone grid. 
It is one of the themes of this chapter that the speed with which it 
was theoretically possible to convey information from place to place— 
by, say, stagecoach, railroad, telegraph, or telephone—was merely one 
dimension of a complex social process. In part, this is because the 
transmission of information involved then—as it does now—not only 
its conveyance but also its routing. Indeed, for many information users, 
the speed with which information was transmitted might well have 
been less valued than its cost and accessibility, and the regularity and 
reliability with which it was conveyed. It is also worth remembering 
that speed is a relative concept. From the standpoint of a merchant in 
the 1830s, a mounted horse express that traveled at ten miles an hour 
was moving extremely fast. After all, with a few minor exceptions, at 
no prior time had information ever been conveyed at a more rapid 
pace. 
The concept of an information infrastructure is somewhat novel, and 
for this reason it deserves a few words of explanation. The phrase 
highlights the fact that the transmission of information has long been 
coordinated by a constellation of institutions, rather than by a single 
government agency or business firm. Often these institutions were 
complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Telegraphy supple-
mented mail delivery, and telephony supplemented telegraphy, without 
rendering either mail delivery or telegraphy obsolete. When Andrew 
Jackson won the presidency in 1828, the principal elements in the 
information infrastructure were the postal system, the stagecoach in-
dustry, and the newspaper press. On the eve of the Civil War, in 1861, 
the infrastructure had expanded to embrace the railroad, the telegraph, 
the wire service, and the commodity exchange. By World War I, it 
had expanded once again to include the railway mail service and the 
telephone grid. 
The concept of an informational environment is also worth a brief 
comment. Although this phrase may seem at bit abstract, it draws 
attention to a familiar enough phenomenon: namely, the far-reaching 
yet often subtle ways in which the information infrastructure has 
shaped, and continues to shape, institutional patterns and cultural 
norms. In this way, it reminds us of the legacy of decisions made long 
in the past. Like the French countryside, the present-day informational 
environment is the product of an ongoing partnership between pur-
poseful human agents and an institutional setting that is so pervasive 
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that it is easily mistaken for a natural world. Just as the farming 
techniques of medieval agriculturists left their mark on the physical 
environment of early modern Europe, so, too, have the actions of 
government administrators, business leaders, and information users of 
all kinds shaped the informational environment of the early twentieth-
century United States. 
Reorienting the Information Infrastructure 
of the Commercial Republic 
Ever since the 1760s, Americans have hailed an informed citizenry as 
a civic ideal. Yet it was not until after the framing of the federal Con-
stitution in 1787 that this ideal was finally translated into law. 
From an institutional standpoint, the world of the framers of the 
Constitution remained an informational ancien regime.1 The early his-
tory of the American postal system is a case in point. Established in 
1775 by the Continental Congress shortly after the start of the War of 
Independence, the system remained a small and uninfluential institu-
tion for the next seventeen years. As late as 1788, the American postal 
system had a mere sixty-nine offices, virtually the same number that 
its colonial counterpart had in 1765.2 
The first postmaster general was Benjamin Franklin, a logical choice 
since, in addition to being a prominent supporter of the colonial cause, 
he had previously spent more than two decades as an administrator in 
the royal postal system. Franklin shared the faith of the Revolutionary 
generation in an informed citizenry. Yet, as postmaster general, he 
merely sought to replicate, under American control, the institution that 
he had helped administer when the postal system had been under the 
Crown. 
Franklin held the postmaster generalship for only a few months 
before giving it over to his son-in-law, Richard Bache. Bache ran the 
institution—with indifferent success—for the duration of the war. 
Bache's successor, Ebenezer Hazard, compiled a decidedly better ad-
ministrative record. It was Hazard, for example, who in 1785 enlisted 
stagecoach contractors for the first time to convey the mail on a regular 
schedule—a practice that, in later decades, would prove influential. 
Yet Hazard lacked the authority—and the Continental Congress lacked 
the will—to institute any permanent changes in policy. 
When the founders of the American republic met in Philadelphia in 
1787 to establish a stronger national government, they had little reason 
to anticipate the full magnitude of the changes in communications 
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policy that were about to occur. Communications policy had figured 
little on the debates over the drafting of the new constitution and 
received scant attention in the Federalist essays that James Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay wrote to help build support for its 
ratification in the pivotal state of New York. 
Only in the years after the framing of the federal Constitution would 
it become evident that the government had an obligation to keep the 
citizenry informed on a regular basis about the affairs of state. With 
the adoption in 1788 of the Constitution by popular consent, this ideal 
acquired the force of a categorical imperative. Now that popular as-
semblies had demonstrated their sovereignty in the most unequivocal 
way by deliberating upon, and approving, a fundamental charter of 
law, it seemed incontrovertible that the citizenry had, at the very least, 
a right to remain well informed.3 Since the postal system was the only 
long-distance communications technology, this put its expansion high 
on the political agenda. 
Key figures in the subsequent restructuring of the information in-
frastructure included Benjamin Rush and James Madison. As Rush 
explained as early as 1787, to adapt the "principles, morals, and man-
ners of our citizens to our republican forms of government," it was 
"absolutely necessary" that the government circulate "knowledge of 
every kind" through every part of the United States. To fulfill this 
ambitious mandate. Rush looked to the postal system, the "true non-
electric wire of government," and the "only means" of "conveying 
light and heat to every individual in the federal commonwealth."4 
Madison editorialized in 1791 that Congress had an obligation to im-
prove the facilities of communication by encouraging commerce, na-
tional improvements, an opposition press, and, most important of all, 
the "circulation of newspapers through the entire body of the people" in 
the mail.5 
The policy innovations that Rush and Madison championed helped 
inspire the passage of the Post Office Act of 1792. This law included 
no ringing preamble to invite detailed historical scrutiny—and thus is 
often overlooked even by specialists in the field. Yet it deserves to be 
remembered as a key event in the history of information in the United 
States. No single legal enactment—not the free press guarantee in the 
First Amendment, not even the provisions for public education that 
Congress mandated in the Northwest Ordinance—did more to insti-
tutionalize the communications revolution that traced its beginnings 
back to the struggle against the Crown.6 
The Post Office Act of 1792 had three main provisions. First, it 
barred government officials from opening personal letters to monitor 
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domestic subversion; second, it admitted newspapers into the mail at 
extremely low rates; and third, it transferred control over the desig-
nation of new post routes from the executive branch to Congress. While 
these might seem like arcane procedural matters, in practice they es-
tablished institutional mechanisms that had broad-ranging practical 
import. The first provision safeguarded civil liberties by establishing a 
precedent for a right to privacy, while the second and third provisions 
guaranteed that, as the area of settlement expanded from the Atlantic 
seaboard to the Trans-Appalachian hinterland, the government would 
provide a far-flung citizenry with subsidized, time-specific information 
on business and public affairs. 
For a time, the expansion of the postal network was constrained by 
the international tensions that culminated in the War of 1812. With 
the ascendancy following the Treaty of Ghent in 1815 of a younger 
generation of nationally minded public figures that included Henry 
Clay, John Quincy Adams, and John McLean, these constraints re-
ceded. Together, these national republicans, as they were commonly 
called, promoted an "American System" that fostered the interre-
gional movement of agricultural staples, manufactured goods, and 
information of all kinds. As postmaster general between 1823 and 
1829, McLean played a particularly conspicuous role in this ambitious 
government-sponsored project. Fittingly, it was during his tenure in 
office that the postmaster generalship was elevated to cabinet rank. 
After all, in the 1820s the postal system first became widely known 
as one of the largest, most politically powerful, and most administra-
tively complex organizations in the country. The rapid rise of the 
postal system to national prominence in this decade was symbolized 
by President Andrew Jackson's decision, shortly after his inauguration 
in 1829, to elevate the institution to the status of a government 
department, a distinction it would retain for the next century and a 
half. 
The expansion of the postal network in the early Republic was a 
remarkable achievement that could not have been anticipated by any 
of the statesmen who had drafted the Constitution in 1787. While in 
1788, the postal system had fewer than 100 offices, by 1800 the total 
had increased to 903, and by 1820 the number was 4,500 (see table 
3.1). The speed at which this network grew struck some contemporar-
ies as nothing short of astonishing; one Washington editor remarked 
in 1826 that the expansion was so rapid as "almost to stagger belief," 
and "did we not know its history to be true, it might pass and be 
received as a romantic tale, having no foundation but in the regions of 
fancy, in the wanderings of imagination."7 
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Table 3.1 The Expansion and Geographical Penetration of the Postal Network, 
1790-1840 
Year Post Offices 
Population per 
Post Office 
Settled Area per 
Post Office 
(square miles) 
1790 75 43,084 3492.7 
1800 903 4,876 339.3 
1810 2,300 2,263 180.2 
1820 4,500 1,796 116.3 
1830 8,450 1,289 75.5 
1840 13,468 1,087 61.4 
Source: Richard R. John, Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin 
to Morse (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 51. 
Note: Population excludes Indians and slaves. 
By 1828, the postal network was complete. At that time, the United 
States, with its 7,500 post offices, had by far the largest postal system 
in the world. From an international perspective, this fact highlighted 
the distinctiveness of the American case. At a time when the United 
States boasted seventy-four post offices per 100,000 inhabitants, Great 
Britain had seventeen, and France four.8 
Perhaps the most revealing measure of the magnitude of the govern-
ment's achievement was the extent to which the postal network had 
kept pace with the westward expansion in the area of settlement. 
Between 1790 and 1840, the settled territory over which the federal 
government presided increased by a remarkable 300 percent; even so, 
the postal network expanded at an even more rapid rate. In 1790 there 
had been one post office for every 3,500 square miles of settled terri-
tory; by 1840, there was one post office for every 61 square miles, an 
increase of almost 600 percent (see table 3.1).9 
As the postal network expanded, so too did the volume of information 
that it conveyed. In 1800, the postal system transmitted 1.9 million 
newspapers and 2 million letters. By 1840, it was transmitting almost 
39 million newspapers and more than 40 million letters (see table 3.2). 
The newspaper totals, postal authorities agreed, were significantly un-
derstated, since accounting procedures were notoriously lax. It is also 
worth remembering that, in this period, newspapers were almost in-
variably read in groups—almost never by solitary individuals, as is the 
custom today. Although it is impossible to say for certain, there is a 
good deal of anecdotal evidence to suggest that, on average, an indi-
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Table 3.2 Letters and Newspapers Transmitted by the Postal System, 1790-1840 
Letters Letters Newspapers Newspapers 
Year (millions) Per Capita (millions) Per Capita 
1790 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 
1800 2.0 0.5 1.9 0.4 
1810 3.9 0.7 n.a. n.a. 
1820 8.9 1.1 6.0 0.7 
1830 13.8 1.3 16.0 1.5 
1840 40.9 2.9 39.0 2.7 
Source: John, Spreading the News, 4. 
Note: Population excludes Indians and slaves; the newspaper total for 1790 is based on data 
for 1791; the newspaper total for 1800 is based on data for 1799. 
vidual copy might well be read—or listened to, as the case might be— 
by as many as a dozen different people.10 
The expansion in newspaper conveyance was particularly impressive, 
since newspapers accounted for the great bulk of the mail. Throughout 
this period, newspapers made up as much as 95 percent of the weight 
of the mail, while accounting for no more than about 15 percent of the 
revenue. In the absence of the newspaper subsidy, it is inconceivable 
that newspapers could have circulated in such numbers or on such a 
geographically extensive scale.11 
Just as the government subsidized the transmission of newspapers, 
it also subsidized the cost of gathering news. Throughout the early 
republic, the government permitted every newspaper editor to receive, 
free of charge, one copy of every other newspaper in the country. 
Newspaper editors came to depend on this privilege for much of the 
material they used to fill their columns. In conjunction with the low 
postal rates, this policy made newspapers editors—including the edi-
tors of the burgeoning country press—one of the most privileged 
occupational groups in the United States. 
Other favored classes of information included magazines and gov-
ernment documents. Magazines enjoyed preferential postal rates be-
ginning in 1794, while government documents passed through the mail 
free of charge, provided only that they bore the signature, or frank, of 
an authorized agent, such as a postmaster or congressman. 
The rapid expansion of the postal network in the early Republic 
owed much to the determination of ordinary Americans to maintain 
close ties with the wider world. Better mail delivery was one of the 
few tangible benefits that Congress had the authority to bestow, and 
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individuals quickly grew expert at lobbying their representative for 
new routes and more frequent service. 
The principal constraint upon postal expansion was the reluctance 
of fiscally prudent congressmen to authorize any improvements in 
service that might run the institution into debt. Indeed, for a time 
postal administrators actually returned to the treasury a modest annual 
surplus. Congress achieved its dual mandate of service and self-
sufficiency by keeping rates on letter postage artificially high. In effect, 
Congress imposed a hidden tax on merchants, the great majority of 
whom lived in New England and the Mid-Atlantic states, in order to 
subsidize the transmission of newspapers and the maintenance of the 
postal network in those parts of the country that could not cover the 
cost—in particular, in the South and West. In some instances, as critics 
did not fail to point out, Congress authorized the establishment of 
routes that could not bear one-hundredth of the expense.12 
The information infrastructure in the early Republic owed little to 
steam power, and nothing to the railroad, which was still in its infancy 
in 1828. As late as 1840, several years after the railroad had begun to 
carry the mail, the horse remained the primary motive power. Though 
postal administrators occasionally arranged to transport the mail by 
steamboat, the stagecoach remained the principal means of conveyance. 
This fact provides a revealing glimpse of how far a sophisticated in-
formation infrastructure can operate without any dependence on fossil 
fuel. 
Among the most important organizational innovations in the infor-
mation infrastructure of the early Republic was the establishment in 
1800 of a network of distribution centers to facilitate the routing of the 
mail. For the next sixty years, this "hub-and-spoke" sorting scheme, 
overseen by a team of middle managers, was a cornerstone of postal 
administration. No longer was it necessary for postmasters to open 
every mail sack at each office, as they had prior to 1800. Surprisingly, 
resilient, this hub-and-spoke sorting scheme was little altered by the 
coming of the railroad; it remained a pillar of the information infra-
structure from 1800 until after the Civil War, when it was gradually 
supplanted by the continuous sorting scheme known as railway mail. 
Equally innovative was the willingness of postal administrators to 
subsidize stagecoach service in order to establish a rudimentary system 
of public transportation. By the 1820s, postal administrators had grown 
accustomed to awarding stagecoach firms sums that significantly ex-
ceeded the cost that they would have had to pay post riders to carry 
the mail. With the possible exception of the newspaper press, few 
enterprises were more dependent on federal largesse. According to one 
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estimate, fully 33 percent of all stagecoach industry revenue came from 
this single source.13 
Since the government provided no comparable bonus for road-
building, the stagecoach subsidy helps to explain why travelers like the 
English writer Charles Dickens complained so frequently about the 
bumpiness of the ride. In effect, the public investment in the means 
of passenger conveyance had outstripped the capacity of the transpor-
tation infrastructure over which the passengers were conveyed. 
The Informational Environment of the 
Commercial Republic 
The completion of the national postal network reoriented the infor-
mational environment of the early American Republic from the Atlantic 
seaboard to the Trans-Appalachian hinterland. In conjunction with a 
rudimentary national banking system, a burgeoning trade in agricul-
tural staples, and a competitive and dynamic commercial sector, the 
postal network hastened the emergence of a national market for infor-
mation. In its absence, it is hard to imagine the rise of geographically 
extended, information-intensive industries such as credit reporting and 
life insurance, or nationally oriented organizations such as the volun-
tary association and the mass party. 
The rapid, regular, and reliable transmission of information was of 
particular importance to merchants engaged in long-distance trade. 
Postmaster General McLean declared in 1828 that "no inconsiderable 
amount of the active capital of the country" was transmitted through 
the postal system every year.14 Each year, one knowledgeable insider 
estimated in 1855, some $100 million was transmitted in this way.15 
Much of this money took the form of bank notes and other forms of 
negotiable currency, all of which went uninsured. Surprising as it 
might seem to us today, it was by no means uncommon for merchants to 
send through the mail as much as $10,000 in cash. While some of this 
money was stolen or lost, the vast majority reached its intended des-
tination. Had theft been endemic, after all, merchants would not have 
continued to rely on the postal system to this extent to settle their ac-
counts. Indeed, there can be few better measures of the effectiveness of 
the institution in this period, or of the high regard in which it was held. 
In cities, towns, and villages throughout the United States, the arrival 
of the mail was a major event. Post offices were almost always located 
in the heart of the business district and were often thronged with 
merchants anxious to hear the latest news. In Rochester, New York, 
Recasting the Information Infrastructure for the Industrial Age 63 
merchants continued to congregate daily at the post office until well 
after the Civil War. This was true, interestingly enough, even on 
Sunday, the one day when virtually every other commercial establish-
ment was obliged by law to shut down. Though convention proscribed 
women from visiting the post office on this day, the lobby was almost 
invariably thronged with men who had stopped by to chat, discuss the 
week's events, and pick up their mail (see figure 3.1). Only in 1912 
did the Post Office Department close its offices to the public on this 
day, ending a practice that dated back to 1810. 
If an individual received anything in the mail, it was far more likely 
to be a newspaper than a letter. Prior to the major letter-rate reductions 
in 1845 and 1851, letter writing remained confined mostly to mer-
Figure 3.1 Post Office, Rochester, New York. Throughout the nineteenth century, the 
post office was a popular place to meet friends, transact business, and catch up on 
the news. This photograph shows the businessmen of Rochester waiting in line to 
pick up their mail. They are assembled in Reynolds' Arcade, an indoor gallery in the 
heart of the city's business district. The date is Sunday, March 25, 1888. According 
to federal law, the post office had to be open for business every day of the week-
including Sunday. The absence of women was no accident. Tradition decreed that on 
Sundays the men were to have the post office to themselves. Note the proximity of 
the telegraph office—another key element of the informational infrastructure of the 
industrial age. Courtesy of the Rochester Historical Society. 
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chants, the well-to-do, and public figures who enjoyed the franking 
privilege, which permitted them to send or received an unlimited 
number of letters free of charge. Postage was customarily borne by the 
recipient, rather than the sender, and could sometimes total 50 cents, 
a substantial sum in an age when many laborers made $1 a day. News-
papers, in contrast, were relatively cheap to transmit, and could be 
sent anywhere within the United States for less than 2 cents a copy. 
The vast majority circulated within an area of, at most, a few hundred 
miles. Only a few—including Nties's Register, the National Intelligencer, 
and, in a slightly later period, the New York Tribune—reached an 
audience that aspired to be genuinely national in scope. 
Like so many features of American society in the early Republic, the 
newspaper market was polycentric. Though Washington was the po-
litical capital—and therefore a major publisher of government docu-
ments—it hosted few influential organs of public opinion, a situation 
that would have been inconceivable in Great Britain or France. 
The novelty of the informational environment sparked a good deal 
of contemporary comment. When the mail arrived, observed one En-
glish visitor in 1814, the townspeople hurried to the post office, where 
they "formed a variety of groups round those who were fortunate 
enough to possess themselves of a paper." This was true, the visitor 
added, not just in the cities, but throughout the countryside. "I am of 
the opinion," he elaborated, "that this general circulation of newspa-
pers throughout America, tends very much to the instruction of the 
country people, and divests them of that air of ignorance and rusticity 
which characterizes the greater part of the peasantry in Europe." The 
information that newspapers conveyed might be "superficial," but it 
gave men a "general acquaintance with the world": 
It sets before them the actions of their countrymen, and the govern-
ment under which they live; it renders them familiar with the trans-
actions of foreign nations; and though confined to a small spot them-
selves, yet at one view they become acquainted with every section of 
the globe. Without a knowledge of what is passing in the world, man 
may be said to be an isolated being; but with a newspaper before him, 
he mixes with society, hears the opinions of others, and may com-
municate his sentiments upon men and things to all parts of the 
world.16 
The democratization of the informational environment struck a spe-
cial chord with painters, who documented its social implications in a 
series of memorable genre scenes. One of the earliest painters to dram-
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atize this theme was John Lewis Krimmel. In "The Village Tavern," 
completed in 1814, Krimmel demonstrated how the arrival of the mail 
during the War of 1812 provided artisans and gentry alike with up-to-
date news from the front, challenging the gentry's monopoly over 
public affairs. The popular appetite for information had simply over-
whelmed the constraints on its widespread circulation. Never again, 
Krimmel seemed to imply, could the gentry presume to monopolize 
access to news from afar (see figure 3.2).17 
Among the most evocative renderings of the voracious public de-
mand for information was Richard Caton Woodville's "War News from 
Mexico" (see figure 3.3). Woodville set his political parable in a post 
öffice during wartime—in this case, the Mexican War. At the cen-
ter of Woodville's canvas is a group of men eagerly scanning a news-
paper for the latest military dispatches. Hovering on the periphery is 
Figure 3.2 "Village Tavern." John Lewis Krimmel completed this painting of the 
interior of a village post office in 1814, toward the end of the War of 1812. The view 
depicts the arrival of newspapers with up-to-date reports about the course of the 
war. Information is freely available to everyone—including women, children, and 
artisans. Note the obvious discomfort the gentleman in the middle of the room; no 
longer will the gentry be able to block the flow of the news. Note also the newspaper-
filled portmanteau that is draped over the shoulder of the mail carrier in the doorway. 
Courtesy of the Toledo Museum of Art. 
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Figure 3.3 "War News from Mexico." Painted in 1848 by Baltimore artist Richard Caton 
Woodville, this scene illustrates the importance of newspapers as a source of infor-
mation about the wider world. The setting is a hotel that also houses the post office, 
a common arrangement in the 1800s. Note that the news is being read aloud, 
a customary practice at the time. On the margins are a wortfei) (partially visible 
in a window) and several African-Americans. They, too, are cusmis about the latest 
news. Yet they are plainly overshadowed by the white men" who, in this period, 
dominated American public life. Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society, 
Worcester, Mass. 
a woman and a free black; Woodville seems to imply that as the public 
sphere expanded beyond the gentry, it has rendered increasingly mar-
ginal the participation of anyone who could not claim to be white and 
male. 
The democratization of the public sphere was, as these paintings 
suggest, not without its ironies and unintended consequences. The 
morally ambiguous character of this process was pointedly revealed in 
1835 when, to appease the South, Postmaster General Amos Kendall 
blocked the transmission into the slaveholding states of information 
dealing with the slavery issue. The resulting information embargo had 
the full approval of President Jackson, and it remained in place until 
the Civil War, significantly exacerbating the growing sectional rift 
between the North and the South. Kendall's conduct struck many as 
of questionable legality, and raised howls of protest in the North. "I 
denounce it," declared Massachusetts Congressman John Quincy Ad-
ams seven years after the event, "as a violation of the freedom of the 
press, as a violation of the sacred character of the post office, and of 
the rights and liberties of all the free people of the United States."18 
The embargo remains to this day as one of the most thoroughgoing 
peacetime assaults on the freedom of the press in U.S. history. The 
willingness of the Jacksonians—long praised as apostles of political 
democracy—to embrace this action underscores one of the paradoxes 
that accompanied the institutionalization of the civic rationale for com-
munications policy that the founders of the republic had so earnestly 
espoused. 
The Railroad and Telegraph Recast the Information 
Infrastructure for the Industrial Age 
The second communications revolution of the long nineteenth century 
was set in motion in the 1840s with the rapid expansion of the railroad 
and the commercialization of the telegraph. The advent of the telegraph 
is often hailed as a decisive turning point in the history of communi-
cations; in certain respects, however, the telegraph was less significant 
than the railroad, which emerged, during this decade, as an important 
means of conveyance for the mail. 
The potential of the railroad for mail delivery had first been glimpsed 
in the 1830s by Postmaster General Kendall. Just as Kendall found 
himself unable to mediate the growing conflict between North and 
South, he also found it impossible to resolve the thorny conflict be-
tween the government and the railroad over the appropriate contract-
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ing terms. Kendall readily conceded the railroad's superiority as a 
mode of conveyance. Yet he warned that existing legislation made it 
extremely difficult for postal administrators to secure satisfactory ar-
rangements, and he even hinted that Congress might be obliged to 
raise postal rates to cover the cost. "Certain it is," Kendall declared, 
"that if the demands of railroad companies are to be satisfied, most of 
whom are not willing to serve the public as they serve individuals, and 
seem to think that the Government is bound to make their investments 
profitable, there will be little left of the means of this department to 
pay for the conveyance of the mails on other lines, much of the interior 
of the country must be deprived of them altogether, and the rates of 
postage, instead of being reduced, must be increased."19 
The crux of the problem was the unsuitability of the existing con-
tracting methods. In the stagecoach era, it made sense for postal ad-
ministrators to advertise for bids to transport the mail, since it was 
relatively easy to start up a new line. In the railroad era, however, this 
assumption no longer made sense, since competition between two rail-
roads on a single route was unknown. As a consequence, railroads were 
free to charge what they wished, and to run their trains in accordance 
with their best interests, even if their scheduling significantly slowed 
the carriage of the mail. 
To help resolve this dilemma, Kendall urged Congress to establish 
a maximum rate for railway mail pay. Though Congress obliged, rail-
roads quickly found various ways to evade this restriction. Kendall also 
briefly experimented with a special horse-express—which he justified, 
in large measure, as an attempt to outpace the railroads. In addition, 
he tried, without success, to secure for the government its own special 
mail train.20 
Kendall's failure to contain contracting costs led his successor, 
Charles Wickliffe, to propose a different approach. To gain control of 
the right-of-way and to help limit expenses, Wickliffe urged Congress 
to award the leading railroad lines a long-term mail contract, in the 
form of a substantial lump sum payment. Had Congress supported 
Wickliffe's proposal, the government would have committed itself to 
making a substantial investment in the completion of the railway net-
work. Yet Congress refused to take Wickliffe's advice, leaving him (and 
his successors) with little recourse but to pay the railroads whatever 
amount they might deem to be fair. 
The failure of Kendall and Wickliffe to work out satisfactory con-
tracting terms had major implications for mail delivery. Unlike their 
counterparts in Great Britain, France, and most of the other European 
countries, U.S. postal administrators never secured control over the 
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scheduling of the railroads that carried the mail. This failure signifi-
cantly complicated the establishment of advantageous routing arrange-
ments and marked a sharp departure from the stagecoach era, when 
postal administrators had routinely coordinated stagecoach schedules 
to minimize unnecessary delays. 
The failure of the government to adapt to the railroad created a 
market niche for the private expresses, a new kind of business enter-
prise that sprang up between 1839 and 1845 in New England and the 
Mid-Atlantic states on the most heavily patronized routes. These firms 
took advantage of the means of conveyance that the railroad provided 
to transport small parcels, including money and letters, in competition 
with the Post Office Department, and in violation of the laws under-
girding the postal monopoly. The first private express was established 
in 1839 by William Harnden, a young man of modest means who had 
previously worked as a conductor on the Boston and Worcester Rail-
road. By 1845, at the height of the boom, dozens of entrepreneurs had 
joined Harnden in transmitting information of all kinds. Though it is 
difficult to know just how much mail these firms conveyed, one con-
gressmen calculated that—in conjunction with other, more informal 
means of conveyance—they were probably transmitting as much as 
two-thirds of all the correspondence in the United States.21 
The private expresses proved popular with merchants and received 
a generally favorable reception in the press. In large measure, this was 
because they charged significantly lower rates than the Post Office 
Department. This proved to be relatively easy, since they operated 
exclusively on routes where Congress had for half a century kept the 
rates on letter postage artificially high. 
The rise of the private expresses confronted the Post Office Depart-
ment with the greatest administrative challenge in its history. Deter-
mined to destroy the competition, Wickliffe vigorously prosecuted 
violations of what he firmly believed to be the government's legally 
guaranteed letter-mail monopoly. Government attorneys instituted 
dozens of suits against individual expressmen, such as James W. Hale, 
who quipped at one point that he was the "most arrested man in the 
world."22 Within Congress, Wickliffe's tactics met with broad bipar-
tisan support. During the extensive debates over postal policy between 
1839 and 1845, no congressman proposed the abolition of the postal 
monopoly, and few praised the private expresses as a laudable example 
of private enterprise. Indeed, the very notion that mail delivery might 
be privatized still remained somewhat exotic, since the concept of 
private enterprise had yet to acquire the positive moral connotation 
that we now take for granted. 
100 A Nation Transformed by Information 
Outside of Congress, the private expresses enjoyed a broad base of 
popular support. Newspaper editors in Boston, New York, Philadel-
phia, and Baltimore championed their cause, as did merchants in New 
England and the Mid-Atlantic states. In 1845, Congress bowed to the 
inevitable and significantly lowered the basic letter rate to 5 and 10 
cents, depending on the distance that the item was conveyed. Subse-
quent legislation in 1851 reduced the basic letter rate even further for 
most domestic destinations to a flat 3 cents—where it remained with 
minor modifications for the next hundred years. 
The independent mail delivery boom hastened the recasting of the 
information infrastructure to accommodate the railroad as a means of 
conveyance. In 1845, Congress eliminated most of the subsidies that 
stagecoach firms had traditionally enjoyed. In 1851, it abandoned the 
presumption that the postal system should remain self-supporting, 
making it possible to draw on general revenue to cover the cost of 
railroad transportation. By this time, the railroad had emerged as the 
principal means of conveyance on the most heavily patronized routes. 
Yet it was not until the Civil War that postal administrators would 
finally begin to scrap the long-outmoded, stagecoach-based, hub-
and-spoke sorting scheme and replace it with the train-based, con-
tinuous sorting scheme that would come to be known as railway 
mail. 
To take full advantage of the routing possibilities that the railroad 
afforded, Postmaster General John Creswell established the Railway 
Mail Service in 1869 as a distinct and largely autonomous branch of 
the Post Office Department. Under the leadership of a succession of 
able superintendents—George A. Armstrong, George N. Bangs, and 
Theodore N. Vail—railway mail quickly established itself as a central 
information infrastructure of the industrial age. 
The Railway Mail Service was one of the first enterprises to coor-
dinate the routing of information throughout the length and breadth 
of the United States. Its mission was deceptively simple: to transmit 
the mail from sender to recipient as rapidly as a passenger could travel 
between these two points. To achieve this goal, railway mail managers 
promulgated an entirely new set of administrative protocols and en-
tered into complex and ongoing negotiations with the postal distribu-
tion centers and the railroads. No other administrative entity trans-
mitted such an enormous number of items, and only Western Union 
operated on a comparable geographical scale. 
At the core of railway mail was an elaborate administrative apparatus 
that was overseen by a superintendent and a staff of geographically 
based division heads with the assistance of a team of roving inspectors. 
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The sorting itself was performed by a cadre of highly trained clerks 
who were much admired for their reliability, accuracy, and esprit de 
corps.23 These men routed the mail for the entire country as they 
traveled about in specially equipped railroad cars fitted with custom-
built wooden sorting cases subdivided into pigeonholes. To help in-
sulate the railway mail clerks from the debilitating effects of patronage 
politics, Congress decreed early on that none were to be subject to 
partisan dismissal—a striking departure from the norms that prevailed 
in the rest of the department. 
The most ambitious project that railway mail administrators spon-
sored during the early years of the service was the "Fast Mail." The 
Fast Mail was a special high-speed train, staffed by railway mail clerks, 
that ran day and night between New York and Chicago on a fixed 
schedule at the then extraordinary speed of forty miles per hour. Far 
more than merely an experiment in high-speed transportation, the Fast 
Mail was a showcase for advanced routing techniques, and a goad to 
all the mail contractors whose lines bisected the New York-Chicago 
route. Inaugurated during the tenure of Superintentent Bangs, the 
Fast Mail was supervised by Bangs's assistant, and soon-to-be succes-
sor, Theodore N. Vail (see figure 3.4). Vail relished the challenge that 
the Fast Mail provided, and he used it to better coordinate not only 
the government's own operations, but also the railroads that the gov-
ernment relied on to carry the mail. Indeed, at one point Vail went so 
far as to propose, unsuccessfully, that Congress grant the Post Office 
Department "absolute power" to determine which trains should carry 
the mail, and how much room they should provide to facilitate its 
sorting.24 
The Fast Mail proved to be expensive, making it a perennial target 
for congressional critics. Yet during its brief heyday in the 1870s, it 
provided its managers with an invaluable lesson in the possibilities of 
administrative coordination. Indeed, to an extent that no one could 
possibly have imagined at the time, it may well have provided Vail— 
who would later go on to a distinguished career in telephony—with a 
foretaste (and, perhaps even a template) for the kind of managerial 
innovations he would later implement at American Telephone & Tele-
graph (AT&T). 
While the Railway Mail Service marked a new major departure in 
the routing of information, it remained dependent on the existing 
transportation-based means of conveyance. For this reason, it has rarely 
been accorded the respectful attention that is routinely lavished on the 
telegraph, the first electrically based communications technology. 
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Figure 3.4 Theodore N. Vail. Vail was the architect of the 'Bell System" and a founder 
of AT&T. This picture was taken in 1878, the year Vail began his career as a telephone 
executive. Vail had just completed a highly successful stint as superintendent of the 
Railway Mail Service—a key element in the information infrastructure of the indus-
trial age. Vail's work for the government taught him a good deal about the manage-
ment of complex systems, knowledge he would later put to good use at AT&T. Courtesy 
of AT&T Archives. 
The telegraph industry in the United States began in 1844 with the 
establishment by Samuel F. B. Morse of a forty-mile line between 
Washington and Baltimore. Morse's project, like most technological 
breakthroughs, had been subtly shaped by preexisting assumptions and 
norms. In particular, it owed a good deal to the well-known system of 
optical telegraphy that Claude Chappe had devised in the 1790s in 
revolutionary France. 
Chappe's telegraph consisted of a chain of towers that had been fitted 
up with a pair of wooden shutters that could be arranged in a variety 
of positions. Under normal conditions, it could transmit a detailed 
message in less than three minutes over a distance of 100 miles. The 
French government invested heavily in the new technology and soon 
established an optical telegraph network that linked all the country's 
major cities. It remained a mainstay of French communications for 
fifty years.25 
Chappe's telegraph popularized the idea that information could be 
transmitted at long distances at an almost instantaneous speed. Indeed, 
Chappe coined the term "telegraphy"—which meant, literally, "writ-
ing at a distance"—to characterize his invention, even though, strictly 
speaking, it was not a recording medium, since it left no written record 
and relied entirely on sight. Though no comparable system was ever 
established in the United States, merchants in Boston and New York 
soon established telegraphs on similar principles to hasten the trans-
mission of information from sea to shore.26 By 1820, more than forty 
newspapers had incorporated some variant on the word "telegraph" 
into their title. A few years later, it would even find its way onto the 
masthead of Andrew Jackson's leading campaign newspaper in the 
election of 1828. Popular interest in the new technology was wide-
spread. "It m u s t . . . be evident to the most common observer," 
declared one optical telegraph enthusiast, "that no means of convey-
ing intelligence can ever be devised, that shall exceed or even equal 
[its] rapidity . . . for, with the exception of the scarcely perceptible 
delay at each station . . . its rapidity may be compared to that of light 
itself."27 
Optical telegraphy held a special fascination for postal administra-
tors, since it offered the possibility of beating out any potential com-
petitor in the transmission of information. Ever since the 1820s, when 
John McLean had proclaimed his determination to outpace any private 
express, a generation of postmasters' general had preached the gospel 
of speed. McLean briefly debated the merits of a government-
sponsored optical telegraphy, as did Amos Kendall, who at one point 
was reputed to have hailed it as "just the thing" to supersede a high-
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speed horse express that he had established between Washington and 
New Orleans.28 
Morse echoed these sentiments, and took it for granted that his tele-
graph should be regulated by the federal government, preferably under 
the control of the Post Office Department. The electric telegraph, 
Morse explained, was but "another mode" of accomplishing the "prin-
cipal object" for which the Post Department had been established, 
"to wit: the rapid and regular transmission of intelligence."29 To help 
bring this about, Morse lobbied Congress to purchase his patent. Only 
when it became obvious that Congress had no intention of buying 
him out did he proceed to develop the new technology as a private 
enteprise. 
Even critics of federal largesse favored governmental control. "In 
the hands of individuals or associations," warned the notorious fiscal 
conservative Cave Johnson, the electric telegraph might become the 
"most potent instrument the world ever knew to effect sudden and 
large speculations—to rob the many of their just advantages, and 
concentrate them upon the few. . . . The use of an instrument so pow-
erful for good or for evil cannot with safety to the people be left in the 
hands of private individuals uncontrolled by law."30 
To Morse's chagrin, Congress refused to purchase his patent, oblig-
ing him and his partners to seek private funding. Jumping at the 
chance, a swarm of promoters began to string telegraph lines between 
the leading commercial centers, inaugurating what one nineteenth-
century telegraph historian called an era of "methodless enthusiasm."31 
By 1848, telegraph lines linked New York to both New Orleans and 
Chicago. By 1850, 12,000 miles of wire had been strung; by 1853 the 
total had almost doubled, to 23,000 miles.32 
Wartime is often a catalyst for innovations in communications tech-
nology, and the Civil War was no exception. Shortly after the fighting 
began in 1861, telegraph promoter Hiram Sibley completed the first 
transcontinental telegraph line between Omaha and San Francisco. 
Sibley's line rendered obsolete the Pony Express, a transcontinental 
horse express that had been established the previous year. The trans-
continental telegraph owed its impetus less to commercial considera-
tions than to political fiat, and, in particular, to a construction subsidy 
that Congress wrote into the Pacific Telegraph Act of i860. For a time, 
it seemed as if Sibley might well extend the telegraph to Europe by 
way of the Bering Strait and Siberia. The construction of a trans-
Siberian line actually began, only to be abandoned in 1866, when the 
news came of the successful completion of a cable under the Atlantic 
between the United States and Great Britain. 
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During the Civil War, the military leaders of both the Union and 
the Confederacy found the telegraph to be an indispensable logistical 
aid. While the telegraph had already been used in various European 
conflicts—most notably, in the Crimean War—it had never before 
been deployed in wartime on such a geographically extensive scale. 
Union military officers proved particularly skilled in putting it to good 
use. By the end of the war, they had authorized the construction of 
some 15,000 miles of line. President Abraham Lincoln relied on a 
steady stream of telegraph dispatches to keep open the lines of com-
munication with his commanders in the field. According to military 
telegrapher David Homer Bates, the president spent more hours during 
these years in the telegraph office at the Department of War than in 
any other place, with the exception of the White House itself.33 
Military mobilization proved particularly advantageous for telegraph 
firms, such as Western Union, that maintained an extensive telegraph 
network inside the Union lines. Western Union officials worked closely 
with the Union army during the war, and, following a brief flurry of 
mergers, emerged in 1866 as the first industrial combine to operate on 
a scale that was at all comparable to the Post Office Department. By 
1880, Western Union transmitted 29.2 million messages over a network 
of 244,000 miles of wire and boasted a network of more than 9,000 
offices (see table 3.3.). Three-quarters of Western Union's offices were 
located in railroad stations, a testament to the pivotal importance of 
the railroad in the information infrastructure of the Industrial Age. 
Western Union officials gained valuable administrative experience 
from the unprecedented mobilization of men and material that had 
Table 3.3 The Expansion of Western Union, 1866-1910 
Telegraph Miles of Wire Messages Handled 
Year Offices (thousands) (millions) 
1866 2,250 76 n.a. 
1870 3,972 112 9.2 
1875 6,565 179 17.2 
1880 9,077 234 29.2 
1885 14,184 462 42.1 
1890 19,382 679 55.9 
1900 22,900 933 63.2 
1910 24,825 1,429 75.1 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), 2:787-788. 
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taken place during the war. Many Western Union telegraphers had 
served in the military telegraph corps, an experience that instilled in 
them a preoccupation with speed and accuracy and a vivid appreciation 
of the power of the state. These habits of mind proved surprisingly 
enduring and would shape Western Union's business strategy for the 
next thirty years. 
Of the many Western Union officials to have been shaped by the 
wartime mobilization, perhaps the most enterprising was William Or-
ton, the first president of Western Union following its consolidation 
in 1866. Though Orton had no formal background in telegraphy, he 
had earned high marks from telegraph investors for his energetic stint 
late in the war as commissioner of inland revenue in the Department 
of Treasury. At Western Union, Orton put to good use the legal, 
administrative, and political skills that he had deployed so effectively 
as a public administrator. In addition to promoting the vigorous ex-
pansion of the firm's core business, the long-distance market, Orton 
dedicated Western Union to providing its customers with information 
in a reliable and impartial way. In this way, as one longtime colleague 
would later recall, Orton strove to elevate the horizons of the enterprise 
to embrace "considerations of citizenship" rather than mere "questions 
of simple profit and loss."34 
Western Union dominated long-distance telegraphy during the 
Gilded Age. To be sure, at various points company officials faced 
serious challenges from the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, the Postal 
Telegraph Company, and the financier Jay Gould. In each of these 
contests, Western Union emerged victorious—although, in the case of 
Gould, at the cost of according him a dominant voice on the board of 
directors, which Gould retained from 1881 until his death in 1892. 
Western Union's position in the intraurban market was considerably 
more precarious. Here it competed with a multitude of firms that 
employed different types of electrical signaling devices, such as fire 
alarms, stock tickers, and call boxes of various kinds. By 1870, thirty-
eight municipalities had fire alarm systems; by 1880, this total had 
increased to 103; by 1902, to 764. Western Union intraurbans included 
the Gold & Stock Company and the American District Telegraph 
Company. In 1885, American District had fifty-two offices and 12,000 
subscribers, and it responded to 6,000 calls a day.35 
To strengthen Western Union's market position, Orton expanded 
its manufacturing capabilities and briefly sponsored a program of re-
search. In 1871, he helped acquire for Western Union a controlling 
interest in Western Electric, a major supplier of telegraphic equipment. 
At roughly the same time, Orton hired a number of inventors—in-
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eluding Thomas Edison and Elisha Gray—to increase the capacity of 
Western Union's wire network. Orton's research program culminated 
with Edison's quadruplex telegraph, a device that could transmit four 
messages simultaneously over a single wire.36 
The greatest threat that Western Union confronted was not economic 
but political. With its consolidation in 1866, the firm became the first 
industrial combine to transcend decisively the boundaries of the indi-
vidual states. Predictably enough, Congress found this situation un-
settling, and in response it passed the Telegraph Act of 1866. This 
legislation granted those telegraph firms that consented to its provisions 
the right to string wires along every post route in the country. In 
return, it obligated these firms to permit Congress to purchase all their 
telegraphic assets at a mutually agreed upon price, should Congress so 
decide. 
The Telegraph Act marked a compromise between Western Union, 
telegraph entrepreneurs who sought a national charter, and reformers 
who favored the outright nationalization of the industry. These West-
ern Union critics were soon joined by several congressmen and Boston 
reformer Gardiner Greene Hubbard who would quickly emerge as 
Western Union's most determined foe. 
Hubbard was a lawyer with extensive experience in public utilities 
and a tireless promoter of projects intended to promote the public 
good. Beginning in 1868, he lobbied Congress for several years to 
charter a "postal telegraph" that would compete with Western Union 
by reducing rates and expanding public access. Hubbard's ideas are of 
interest, since, in the following decade, he would become a key backer 
of the Bell Company, the progenitor of the Bell System and AT&T. 
Hubbard lost few opportunities to chastise Western Union for its 
failure to realize the democratic potential that he believed to inhere in 
the new technology. From his standpoint, Western Union's rates were 
too high, its service too limited, its technology too primitive, and its 
offices too few. In articulating a position he had held for fifteen years, 
Hubbard declared in 1883: "As a telegraph for business, where dispatch 
is essential and price is of little account, the Western Union system is 
unrivaled; but as a telegraph for the people it is a signal failure."37 
Hubbard was a keen student of communications policy, and his views 
were strongly reminiscent of the arguments that postal reformers such 
Joshua Leavitt had deployed in the 1840s in urging a reduction in the 
basic letter rate. Like Leavitt, Hubbard firmly believed that the Amer-
ican people had a God-given right to communicate with each other, 
and that existing institutions were impeding the free flow of informa-
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tion. If Western Union would not perform this public service, Hubbard 
believed, then Congress had an obligation to fill the void. 
Neither Orton nor his successor Norvin Green found Hubbard's 
arguments persuasive, and they rebutted these arguments at length in 
a series of reports, magazine articles, and congressional hearings. The 
controversy ranged widely over many topics that included the techni-
cal innovativeness of Western Union; the funding and administration 
of telegraphy in Belgium, Switzerland, and various other European 
countries; and the advantages and disadvantages of government con-
trol. One key disagreement involved differing perceptions of the social 
utility of the new technology. Hubbard firmly believed that telegra-
phy, like mail delivery, was a democratic medium with an enormous 
potential to transform social relations. Orton and Green did not. If 
Western Union reduced its rates to the level of postage, Green pre-
dicted in 1890, he did not believe that 10 percent of the people would 
prefer telegraphing their sentiments to communicating by mail. This 
was because, Green explained, the telegraph was "essentially" an 
"adjunct of commerce and speculation, requiring immediate com-
munication and answer," rather than a vehicle of popular communi-
cation.38 It was, in short, a private enterprise that served a limited 
market, rather than a public utility that met the needs of the public at 
large. 
Though Congress never established a postal telegraph, Hubbard's 
critique had a subtle yet far-reaching influence on Western Union's 
business strategy. For the next quarter century, Western Union offi-
cials remained convinced that, at some point in the near future, the 
government would purchase Western Union's assets and nationalize 
the industry—just as the government had in Great Britain, France, 
and every other leading industrial nation. To forestall this as long as 
possible, Western Union officials did their best to make the case for 
private control. Ironically, this business strategy encouraged Western 
Union officials to narrow their time-horizons, focus on short-term 
profits, and downplay the long-term competitive challenge that was 
posed by new communications technologies such as the telephone.39 
The Informational Environment during the Transition 
from Commercial Republic to Industrial Nation 
Few events in the nineteenth century raised greater expectations than 
the advent of telegraphy. The new technology was an agency of "almost 
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superhuman facilities," or so declared one of Morse's business partners 
in 1845: "Every interest, political, social, commercial, and industrial, 
will find the use of the telegraphic facilities sine qua non. . . . It is des-
tined to effect a revolution in the business, the social, political, com-
mercial and industrial relations of men, such as neither the more 
potential physical power of steam, nor the noiseless influence of the 
compass, has developed, gigantic and sublime, to the contemplative 
mind, as the results of each have been, and are, and are to be. . . ."40 
The actual development of the new technology was decidedly more 
prosaic. Early telegraphy was often irregular and could be surprisingly 
slow. Storms often interrupted service, and even in good weather 
operators were bedeviled by technical difficulties that stemmed from 
poor insulation. To make matters worse, telegraphy had to compete 
with mail delivery, which by 1844 had attained a high level of service. 
It was hard to convince Americans to patronize the new technology; 
in the words of one telegraph promoter, looking back on the early days 
of the industry, the Post Office Department already "served every 
purpose of ordinary intercourse."41 Long after the telegraph had be-
come an established institution, a postal clerk could still report that 
the arrival of a single letter could still could "convulse the market" 
and create a "commotion" at the commercial exchange.42 It was not 
until the 1880s that the number of telegrams Western Union trans-
mitted would equal the number of letters that the Post Office Depart-
ment had delivered in 1840—which was prior to the passage of the 
Post Office Act of 1845. 
Mail delivery remained particularly important in the sparsely settled 
and newly developed regions of the West. Here, as one postal admin-
istrator noted in 1880, the "comparative scarcity and expensiveness" 
of the telegraph rendered merchants entirely dependent upon the Post 
Office Department.43 Even journalists were slow to make the transition. 
In the period between 1844 and i860, for example, only 8 percent of 
news stories in American newspapers originated as telegraphic dis-
patches, while 46 percent still came by mail.44 
The advantages of mail delivery were especially evident following 
the passage of the Post Office Acts of 1845 and 1851, which it made 
possible, for the first time in U.S. history, to send a letter without 
worrying about the cost. Telegrams, in contrast, remained relatively 
expensive throughout the century. Though rates varied widely, de-
pending on a number of factors, including the competitive situation, a 
ten-word telegraph message almost never cost less than 50 cents. In 
1876, it cost $2.00 to send a ten-word telegram between New York 
and San Francisco. In contrast, it cost a mere 3 cents to send a letter 
17 A Nation Transformed by Information 
this distance—and the letter might contain hundreds, or, conceivably, 
even thousands of words.45 
The limited facilities that Western Union provided further con-
strained its utility. As late as 1880, for example, Western Union had a 
mere 9,000 offices, far fewer than the 43,000 offices in the postal 
network. And, as critics like Hubbard were quick to point out, three-
quarters of these offices were in railroad stations—which, unlike post 
offices, were often inconveniently located far from the center of town. 
Perhaps the best index of the relative importance of the Post Office 
Department and Western Union was the size of their operating bud-
gets. At no time did Western Union's annual revenue exceed that of 
the Post Office Department. Between 1870 and 1890, the operating 
budget of the Post Office Department was, on average, three times as 
large as that of Western Union. In 1880, for example, the Post Office 
Department had $33.3 million in operating revenue; Western Union, 
$10.6 million. In 1900, the gap had widened, with the Post Office 
Department bringing in more than $100 million, and Western Union, 
a mere $23 million (see table 3.4). 
Through data on telegraphic usage are hard to come by, several 
generalizations can be ventured. Few Americans ever had occasion to 
send a telegraph—far fewer than wrote letters or received a newspaper 
in the mail. A mere 2 percent of the American people, estimated 
Western Union President Norvin Green in 1887, ever had had occasion 
to send a message by wire. Fully 87 percent of all the messages that 
Western Union did transmit, Green added, were business-related. Of 
Table 3.4 Relative Expenditures on Mail Delivery, Telegraphy, and Telephony, 1866-
1920 
Post Office Department Western Union Bell System 
operating revenue operating revenue operating revenue 
Year (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) 
1866 14.4 4.6 0.0 
1870 18.9 6.7 0.0 
1880 33.3 10.6 3.1 
1890 60.9 20.1 16.4 
1900 102.4 22.8 46.1 
1910 224.1 30.7 164.3 
1914 287.9 45.9 224.5 
1920 437.2 n.a. 448.2 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, 2:785-786, 787-788, 804-805. 
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the remainder, 8 percent were news-related, and the remaining 5 per-
cent personal. Many of the business-related telegrams were frankly 
speculative—or, as Green put it, had been occasioned by the buying 
and selling of goods where "no transportation and often no delivery is 
ever made."46 
A substantial fraction of this speculation took place outside of the 
regular commercial exchanges, in the so-called "bucket shops." These 
controversial, often precarious, and sometimes clandestine businesses 
permitted small operators to speculate in agricultural commodities and 
corporate securities without having to work through a mercantile 
exchange. Bucket shops, Green observed, generated a "considerable 
percentage" of Western Union's total revenue, by "selling and buying, 
forfeiting margins when they expired, settling, when the customers 
shall demand, at the quoted price at the instant, and no delivery is ever 
pretended to be made."47 
Among the heaviest telegraph users were merchants trading in ag-
ricultural staples such as cotton and wheat. Since these staples had a 
ready market in Europe, price information was a valuable asset, par-
ticularly in commercial entrepots located far from the Atlantic sea-
board, such as the cotton ports of New Orleans and Mobile and the 
wheat-processing marts of Buffalo, St. Louis, Minneapolis, and 
Chicago. A business editor remarked in 1854 that before the coming 
of the telegraph, traders had taken advantage of advance information 
to speculate in agricultural staples on an enormous scale. Each year, 
the editor estimated, planters had lost some forty million dollars in 
this way—a sum that, since the telegraph, had been reduced to prob-
ably one-twentieth its former magnitude.48 
While the telegraph hardly eliminated speculation, it did change its 
character. Now that price data were transmitted telegraphically, traders 
lost the ability to capitalize on advance knowledge of price differentials 
in distant locations. Instead, they began to speculate about the likely 
price of staples at specific future dates. Time, as it were, supplanted 
space as the great unknown. Before long, this practice led to the 
establishment of the futures market. Odd as it might seem, traders 
began to purchase crops that had yet to be harvested—and even that 
had yet to be planted. Planters and farmers found this arrangement 
advantageous, since it enabled them to sell their crop at a predictable 
price, protecting themselves against an unexpected market downturn. 
Traders hoped to profit from unanticipated increases in market de-
mand, and sometimes they tried to drive up the price by purchasing a 
large fraction of the available contracts and refusing to sell. 
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To coordinate these complex transactions better, merchants estab-
lished the modern mercantile exchange. The Chicago Board of Trade 
dated from 1848, the same year the telegraph reached the city. In the 
next few years merchants set up similar institutions in several other 
leading commercial centers, including St. Louis, Minneapolis, and 
Buffalo.49 Often these exchanges were located at quite a distance from 
the site of production. The principal cotton exchange, for example, 
was located in New York City rather than Mobile or New Orleans.50 
Mercantile exchanges transformed agricultural staples into easily 
quantified abstractions that could be bought or sold. For the first time, 
it became possible to purchase a given quantity of a specific agricultural 
staple in a distant market without having to rely on middlemen with 
first-hand information about local conditions. In the process, agricul-
tural staples became commodities, something they had never been in 
nature.51 
Telegraphy had analogous consequences for the transmission of news. 
To regularize news transmission, several New York editors joined 
together in the 1840s to form the New York Associated Press. Before 
long, the Associated Press became a newsbroker, and information a 
commodity.52 Telegraph officials granted newsbrokers various privi-
leges, including special rates and—most important of all—preferential 
access to the telegraph wires. The ability of newsbrokers like the 
Associated Press to coordinate the distribution of time-sensitive infor-
mation gave them an influence that many regarded as politically dan-
gerous, and which embroiled the industry in a number of public con-
troversies in the Gilded Age. 
Few firms used the telegraph more intensively than the railroad. In-
deed, there is more than a little truth to the nineteenth-century com-
monplace that the railroad and the telegraph marched together across 
the continent as the "Siamese twins of commerce" (see figure 3.5)." 
Telegraphic train-dispatching helped managers prevent accidents, co-
ordinate operations, and generate the data necessary to monitor traffic 
flows. Financier Jay Gould declared that without the active cooperation 
of the railroads, the telegraph system, "in its broadest and most popular 
features" had no financial basis "by which it could exist, as a valuable 
enterprise, for an hour."54 
During the early years of telegraphy, the relationship of the telegraph 
and the railroad was hardly self-evident. Had the railroad never been 
invented, the first decade of commercial telegraphy would have been 
substantially unchanged. After all, the primary users of the new tech-
nology were merchants dealing in agricultural staples, and the primary 
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Figure 3.5 American Progress. This lithograph was based on an 1872 painting by 
John Gast. According to its caption, i t represents the "grand drama of Progress in 
the civilization, settlement, and history of this country." Emblematic of this progress 
was the "Star of Empire," the robed woman who hovers over the westward movement. 
Among her gifts is information. In her right hand she carries a book (the testimon-
ial of our national enlightenment"), in her left, a telegraph line ("to flash intelli-
gence throughout the land"). Source: Crofutt's New Overland Tourist and Pacific Coast 
Guide (Chicago: Overland Publishing, 1879-1880), 2:12-13. Courtesy of Robert 
Dalton Harris. 
axis linked New York and New Orleans—a route that the railroad had 
yet to traverse. 
The slow adoption of telegraphic train dispatching was particularly 
surprising since, in the United States—in contrast, for example, to 
Great Britain—most railroads were single-tracked. Single-tracking cut 
down on capital costs, yet it greatly increased the risk of collision and 
enormously complicated the administrative challenge of coordinating 
routine operations. "The telegraph is rarely seen in America running 
beside the railway," remarked one English editorialist in 1854, "for 
what reason we do not know; the consequence, however, is that loco-
motion in the United States is vastly more dangerous."55 
The first American railroad to experiment extensively with tele-
graphic train-dispatching was the New York & Erie. Station managers 
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relied on telegraphy to regulate train movements as early as 1851, 
though the procedure does not seem to have been systematized for a 
number of years.56 
The Erie's general superintendent, Daniel McCallum, wrote a report 
that in 1856 describing the new uses for the telegraph. McCallum was 
one of the first managers to clearly delineate the lines of authority on 
a major railroad and he regarded the telegraph as an indispensable 
managerial tool. "It would occupy too much space," McCallum de-
clared, "to allude to all the practical purposes to which the telegraph 
is applied in working the road; and it may suffice to say, that without 
it, the business could not be conducted with anything like the same 
degree of economy, safety, regularity, or dispatch. . . ,"57 McCallum 
required station managers to transmit by telegraph hourly reports stat-
ing the precise position on the line of every passenger train and every 
important freight train. Should a train run significantly behind sched-
ule—ten minutes for a passenger train, thirty minutes for a freight 
train—McCallum required the conductor to report the cause of the 
delay to the telegraph operator when he reached the next station. The 
operator, in turn, was responsible for transmitting regular reports to 
the general superintendent. At this point, it was transcribed, as fast as 
it was received, on a "convenient tabular form," that showed, "at a 
glance" the "position and progress of trains, in both directions, on 
every division of the road."58 
McCallum used the data generated by the telegraph to hasten what 
business historian Alfred D. Chandler Jr., has called "control through 
statistics." McCallum's goal was not simply to improve safety, but also 
to coordinate more effectively the deployment of resources. Indeed, 
McCallum went so far as to contend that a single-tracked railroad that 
relied on telegraphy to coordinate the movement of its rolling stock 
was actually superior to a double-tracked railroad that continued to 
rely on more rudimentary methods. 
Within a few years, McCallum's example was emulated by most of 
the other leading eastern railroads—including the Baltimore & Ohio, 
the New York Central, and the Pennsylvania. During the 1860s, tele-
graphic train-dispatching became commonplace throughout the United 
States. In the West, the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy led the way, 
followed by the Illinois Central.S9 The first telegraph superintendent 
on the Illinois Central was hired in 1862; a few years later managers 
issued a printed rule book that included an extensive section on "Move-
ment of Trains by Telegraph."60 Other lines soon followed their lead, 
often at the instigation of Western Union officials.61 
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Telegraphic train-dispatching benefited both the railroad and the 
telegraph. Railroads received an unlimited amount of free telegraphing 
on the road and a certain amount of free telegraphing throughout the 
rest of the network. Since railroad managers could telegraph free of 
charge, it is difficult to know just how much information they trans-
mitted; in all probability, the volume was enormous. Telegraph firms 
secured free office space and telegraph operators, as well as the free 
transportation of poles, wires, and other materials. Most important of 
all, they received an exclusive right to transmit messages over the 
railroad's right-of-way, forestalling competition and ensuring them-
selves a reliable conduit for their own long-distance traffic.62 
Just as the telegraph facilitated the administrative coordination of 
the railroad, it also became a key managerial tool in manufacturing. 
Beginning in the 1850s, a number of industrial firms began to place 
unprecedented demands on the information infrastructure. These en-
terprises were typically much larger and more complex than any in-
stitution in the period prior to 1840, with the exception of the Post 
Office Department. Had these firms' managers not been able to rely 
on the fast and reliable means of communication that the telegraph 
provided, it would have been more difficult, if not impossible, for them 
to have attained the administrative coordination of production and 
distribution that was such a key feature of the business enterprise in 
the industrial age. 
Firms adopted telegraphy selectively. In credit reporting agencies, 
the telegraph proved to be a less important technological innovation 
than the typewriter—since, unlike the typewriter, it was used primarily 
in unusual circumstances, and never for the routine transmission of 
information.63 Telegraphy played an equally modest role in iron and 
steel, presumably because managers did not find it necessary to main-
tain tight control over their stock.64 
In businesses that specialized in perishable products, such as meat-
packing, telegraphy quickly became indispensable. By the 1880s, two 
leading Chicago meat packers, Armour and Swift, required daily tele-
graphic reports from their East Coast agents on the state of the market. 
In an average year, the total cost of these dispatches came to $200,000, 
a substantial sum.65 Meat spoiled rapidly, and the packers regarded it 
as extremely vital to know how much they could safely ship. "The 
head offices are in constant telegraphic communication with the branch 
houses and commission agents during the progress of the sale of each 
carload of beef, obtaining information and giving advice." declared one 
government observer.66 
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The Telephone Completes the Information 
Infrastructure of the Industn'al Age 
In February 1876, Alexander Graham Bell secured the first in a series 
of patents for a device to transmit the human voice by wire. Bell's 
patents became the legal cornerstone of the American Bell Telephone 
Company, the progenitor of American Telephone & Telegraph, which 
American Bell established in 1885 as a subsidiary to develop the long-
distance market. Following a reorganization in 1899, AT&T became 
the parent firm, with full control over the federation of manufacturing 
facilities, operating companies, and research and development labora-
tories that together came to be known as the Bell System. By World 
War I, the Bell System had become the final element in the information 
infrastructure of the Industrial Age and one of the largest and most 
innovative technological systems in the world. As late as 1910, however, 
AT&T's annual operating revenue had yet to match that of the Post 
Office Department. But by 1920, AT&T had decisively pulled ahead 
(see table 3.4). Much like the completion of the postal network in the 
1820s, the rise of the Bell System elicited a fair amount of editorial 
comment. As one journalist declared, the telephone was "unquestion-
ably" the "greatest industrial and commercial achievement of the 
American people."67 
Prior to the breakup of the Bell System in 1984, AT&T executives 
often described the telephone network as the most complicated ma-
chine ever built. While this claim is somewhat self-serving, it does 
highlight the abiding preoccupation of Bell executives with what his-
torians have come to call the "network mystique." In recent decades— 
in particular, in the 1960s and 1970s—Bell managers spent a dispro-
portionate amount of time and energy in an ultimately futile attempt 
to protect their communications empire from outside assault. Yet, in 
the early years of the industry—especially in the period preceding 
World War I—this distinctive mindset, which combined a disparage-
ment of competition with a faith in public oversight, systems integra-
tion, and technical expertise, provided a generation of talented business 
leaders with a mandate that helped to make AT&T a highly innovative 
firm.68 
Few today would question the utility of telephony in the home as 
well as the office. Yet when Bell secured his patent, it remained un-
certain just how the new technology would be used. Unlike the tele-
graph—which, from the start, met the needs of merchants dealing in 
agricultural staples—the telephone did not fill an obvious market niche. 
According to Elisha Gray—a respected authority on electrical appli-
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cations, and himself the inventor of an early telephone—the new tech-
nology had limited commercial value and was merely a "scientific 
toy."69 
The successful commercialization of telephony in the United States 
owed a good deal to the creative leadership of its early champions. 
Particularly influential were promoter Gardiner Greene Hubbard, in-
ventor Alexander Graham Bell, and manager Theodore N. Vail. 
Hubbard's involvement in telephony grew directly out of his own 
prior experience with telegraphic reform. Though Hubbard was no 
inventor, he was well aware of the commercial value of an acoustic 
telegraph that, like the quadruplex, could transmit multiple messages 
over a single wire. He was thus understandably intrigued when he 
learned that Bell was experimenting with just such a device. 
Hubbard bankrolled Bell's experiments in the expectation that Bell 
would invent an improved telegraphic instrument that Hubbard could 
sell to Western Union. Bell had other ideas. Far less interested in 
multiple telegraphy than in voice transmission, Bell hoped to invent a 
machine that could transmit human speech. Hubbard initially regarded 
Bell's research on telephony as a distraction, and did all he could to 
keep Bell focused on the multiplex. Bell refused to give up his work 
on the telephone, even though he had good reason not to alienate his 
patron (among other things, he had fallen in love with Hubbard's 
daughter, Mabel, whom he hoped to marry). 
Hubbard was initially reluctant to commercialize the new technology 
himself. Just as Morse had hoped to sell his telegraph patent to the 
government, so Hubbard tried at first to unload the telephone on 
Western Union. Toward this end, at some point in the fall of 1876 
Hubbard arranged an interview with William Orton. Precisely what 
the two men said to each other during their conference remains a 
matter of speculation, since no first-hand account has survived. Many 
years later, one of Bell's closest associates, Thomas A. Watson, re-
counted that Hubbard had offered Western Union Bell's telephone 
patent for $100,000, and that Orton had declined.70 
Orton's refusal to purchase Bell's patent is often cited as one of the 
worst decisions in the annals of U.S. business. Yet it is not hard to 
understand why he acted as he did. Hubbard had long been one of 
Western Union's most outspoken critics, and Orton was, quite natu-
rally, reluctant to reward his longtime adversary with what was, at the 
time, a quite substantial sum. It was Orton's "repugnance" toward 
Hubbard, one telegraph official later reminisced, that prevented him 
from acquiring for Western Union a "controlling interest" in Bell's 
invention at a "very low cost."71 
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Once Hubbard discovered that there was no easy way to cash in on 
Bell's patents, he set about to commercialize the telephone himself. On 
July 9, 1877, Hubbard formally drew up papers to establish the Bell 
Telephone Company as a patent association. Two days later, Bell 
married Mabel Hubbard in Hubbard's front parlor. 
Hubbard had long criticized Western Union for its narrow focus on 
the business market and aspired to establish the telephone industry on 
a broader, more inclusive foundation. Middle-class Americans such as 
himself (Hubbard frequently presented himself as such in his numer-
ous essays on telegraphic reform) constituted a potentially enormous 
market for communications that Western Union had conspicuously 
neglected.72 
Bell shared Hubbard's idealism, and in 1878 prophesied that the 
telephone would one day become an everyday medium of social com-
munication on a nationwide scale. At a time when telephony remained 
limited for technical reasons to a distance of twenty miles, and a host 
of related issues had yet to be resolved, this was an extraordinary claim. 
Explaining his beliefs to one group of investors, Bell said that in the 
future telephone wires would unite the "head offices" of the telephone 
company in different cities, making it possible for individuals to com-
municate over vast distances by "word of mouth." Bell conceded that 
such ideas might appear "Utopian and out of place." Yet he remained 
confident that "such a scheme" would be the ultimate result of the 
commercialization of the new technology, and urged investors to at all 
times keep this "end in view," so that "all present arrangements of the 
telephone may be eventually realised in this grand system."73 
Bell focused, like Hubbard, on the middle-class market, broadly 
conceived. In particular, he envisioned the telephone replacing the 
speaking tubes, bell pulls, and other devices that the well-to-do relied 
on to maintain contact with their household staff. Once householders 
became accustomed to the new technology, he reasoned, they would 
urge its extension to stores and offices and push for the establishment 
of a central exchange. In an age when even modest middle-class house-
holds employed one or more servants, this was an ingenious strategy, 
and one that was well calculated to help insure that the arbiters of taste 
and fashion would soon come to regard the new industry in a favorable 
light. 
This expansive vision of the potential of the new technology shaped 
its commercialization in several ways. To encourage homes as well as 
offices to install telephones, Hubbard offered residential users special 
low rates. And to promote its widespread use, he offered subscribers 
unlimited monthly service for a single fee. This rate structure had the 
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advantage of being relatively simple to administer. Other pricing 
schemes, based on message units, could have been devised—and some 
were, particularly in Europe. 
Equally innovative was Hubbard's development strategy. Fearful 
that poor-quality service would raise doubts about the soundness of 
the new technology (and also intent on securing a steady return), 
Hubbard refused to sell telephones outright. As an alternative, he 
licensed promoters to establish operating companies in specific locali-
ties. Typically, Bell licensees solicited subscribers in a relatively small 
geographical area, such as a city or town, whom they then connected 
to a central switchboard or exchange. Few of these exchanges inter-
connected, at least at first, since technological constraints limited a 
telephone conversation to a range of no more than about twenty miles. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, Hubbard's development strategy 
furnished a key precedent for two key tenets of the Bell System: 
namely, that the parent firm would maintain technical standards among 
the operating companies and that it would control the manufacturing 
of the necessary equipment, including the switchboards and tele-
phones. 
Hubbard's greatest administrative achievement was his recruitment 
of Theodore N. Vail as Bell's first general manager. Hubbard first met 
Vail in 1876 during a trip that Hubbard took across the country as the 
chairman of a special government commission on railway mail pay. 
Hubbard was much impressed by the vigor, breadth of vision, and 
organizational acumen that Vail brought to the superintendence of 
the Railway Mail Service, and he urged Vail to cast his lot with the 
fledgling telephone industry. Vail, for his part, found Hubbard's en-
thusiasm for telephony infectious, and, frustrated by congressional 
opposition to his ambitious plans for the Fast Mail, jumped at the 
chance to make a fresh start. 
Vail's greatest administrative challenge at Bell came during the very 
first year of his appointment. The antagonist, predictably enough, was 
Western Union. Now convinced of the merits of the new technology, 
President Orton decided in late 1877 to enter the telephone business. 
Since Western Union had already established a subsidiary in intraurban 
telegraphy, it proved relatively easy to set up the American Speaking 
Telephone Company as a rival to Bell. 
For a brief moment in the late 1870s, Western Union seemed poised 
to dominate the telephone industry and relegate Alexander Graham 
Bell to a footnote in the annals of invention. In addition to its own 
telephone patents, Western Union had at its disposal a formidable 
array of administrative and legal talent, an almost unlimited supply of 
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capital, and an ownership stake in Western Electric, the largest man-
ufacturer of electrical equipment in the country. American Speaking 
Telephone established operating companies faster than Bell and se-
cured a beachhead in several major cities, including New York and 
Chicago. (The firm even had, in its secretary, James D. Reid, its own 
corporate historian. When, for example, Reid described in 1879 the 
newly emerging telephone industry in the first edition of his history 
of telegraphy, he treated the American Speaking Telephone Company 
in some detail, while omitting from his discussion any mention what-
soever of Hubbard or Bell.74) 
Though Bell's defenders could not hope to match Western Union's 
resources, they were not without some key assets of their own. In 
addition to Bell's patents and Hubbard's zeal, they had in Vail a skillful 
tactician with a keen grasp of the relevant issues. As his first official 
act as general manager, Vail sent every Bell licensee a copy of Bell's 
first patent, with a note enjoining them to keep up the fight against 
Western Union. In the ensuing months, Vail worked diligently to 
secure for the licensees the funding necessary to stave off the compe-
tition, and to force Western Union onto the defensive by suing it for 
infringing on Bell's patent rights.75 
Most important, Vail helped convince Boston financier William H. 
Forbes to invest in the firm.76 Forbes quickly became the leader of a 
group of Boston investors who provided the Bell Company with a 
much-needed infusion of cash. In the absence of the financial resources 
that the Boston group provided, it is hard to imagine how the fledgling 
Bell Company could have met the challenge that Western Union posed. 
In recognition of this contribution, in early 1879 Hubbard renamed 
the firm the National Bell Telephone Company, and persuaded the 
Massachusetts legislature to increase the amount of capital that it was 
legally entitled to raise. 
Hubbard and Bell had assumed that the National Bell stockholders 
would chose Hubbard as the first president of the reorganized firm. 
To their surprise, the investors settled on Forbes. Forbes's appoint-
ment curtailed Hubbard's authority, and deeply worried Bell, who 
feared that Forbes might cut a deal with Western Union that would 
tarnish his scientific reputation. Yet as it turned out, neither had much 
cause for concern, since Forbes fully shared their determination to 
battle Western Union.77 
In November 1879, following extended negotiations, Forbes emerged 
triumphant, having persuaded Orton's successor, Norvin Green (Orton 
had died in 1878), to cede the telephone market to National Bell. This 
agreement, Vail later observed, was "the most important single event 
Recasting the Information Infrastructure for the Industrial Age 101 
in the history of the telephone business."78 For its part, Western Union 
promised to stay out of telephony, and to transfer to Bell its telephone 
assets—including its operating companies and every one of Edison's 
and Gray's patents. In return, Bell agreed to turn over to Western 
Union all of the interurban telegraph messages originating in Bell 
telephone exchanges, and to pay Western Union a generous royalty for 
the next seventeen years on every telephone it leased. 
In retrospect, Green's abandonment of the telephone industry seems 
no less shortsighted than Orton's refusal to purchase Bell's patent. Yet, 
at the time, it too made a certain amount of sense. Preoccupied with 
the long-distance business market—and resigned, as Orton had been 
before him, to the eventual government takeover of Western Union's 
assets—Green concluded it was simply not worth the effort to embark 
on a new venture that might not realize its full commercial potential 
for another twenty-five years. Green's lawyers had advised him that 
Bell's patents would prove hard to contest, and Green lacked the 
stomach for a fight. Though Green's negotiations with Forbes did 
occur during the same months Green was immersed in a fierce com-
petitive struggle with the financier Jay Gould, there are few hints in 
Green's correspondence that Gould's threat influenced Green's deci-
sion to sell out. Far more important was Green's revulsion at the 
prospect of a long, drawn-out competitive struggle. In the end—as 
Green explained to Forbes, after the final settlement had been 
reached—Western Union had been willing to compromise for the sake 
of "peace and harmony" and to avoid the "trouble, loss, and expense 
of a wasteful competition."79 
The acquisition of Western Union's telephone business significantly 
augmented Bell's burgeoning network of operating companies. By 
1881, as Forbes took care to point out in Bell's first published stock-
holder's report, Bell and its licensees had established telephone service 
in all but nine of the nation's cities with a population of more than 
io,ooo.80 Since telephony was a mere five years old, this statistic dem-
onstrated an impressive record of growth. 
Following the Western Union settlement, Forbes and Vail moved 
swiftly to consolidate their rapidly expanding telephone empire. In 
1881, they once again increased the firm's legal capitalization, and 
changed the firm's name, this time to the American Bell Telephone 
Company, a moniker it would retain for the next twenty years. In 
addition, Bell lawyers redoubled their efforts to protect Bell's patent 
position, which from the outset they had defended with great skill. 
Between the granting of Bell's first patent in 1876 and the expiration 
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of Bell's last major patent in 1894, Bell lawyers found themselves 
embroiled in 600 separate legal disputes; they never lost a case.81 
Of particular importance for the future was Vail's 1881 acquisition 
of a controlling interest in Western Electric—a leading manufacturer 
of electrical equipment that, for the past ten years, had been affiliated 
with Western Union. The following year, Western Electric became an 
exclusive supplier of Bell telephone equipment, a position it would 
long retain. Interestingly, Western Electric's owners fully supported 
the takeover; they reasoned that, if the company remained independent, 
Bell might well enter into an exclusive manufacturing agreement with 
some other firm.82 
The acquisition of Western Electric helped make American Bell one 
of the first business enterprises to promote continuing research in the 
production and development of electrical equipment. In this way, Bell 
executives established a tradition that would culminate in 1925 with 
the establishment of Bell Labs, a key element in the information in-
frastructure of the Information Age. 
Vail left AT&T in 1887 following a quarrel with the Boston investors 
over financial policy, but by this time he had established the firm on a 
foundation that it would maintain for the next 100 years.83 One early 
milestone came in 1884, when, under Vail's leadership, American Bell 
established the first commercial telephone service between Boston and 
New York, a distance of several hundred miles. Slowly but steadily, 
Bell-funded engineers were making advances in transmission technol-
ogy that made it possible to link the various operating companies in a 
single interconnected network. No longer would telephony remain 
restricted to a mere twenty miles. Vail's preoccupation with transmis-
sion technology occasioned his appointment, in 1885, as the first pres-
ident of American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T), a wholly owned 
subsidiary with a mandate to focus on long-distance transmission. 
Eight years later, following Vail's departure, AT&T achieved another 
technical breakthrough when, for the first time, it extended service 
from New York to Chicago. 
With the expiration of Bell's last major patent in 1894, Bell executives 
suddenly confronted a host of newly chartered telephone firms. In the 
following decade, some 6,000 independents sprang up throughout the 
United States. These firms offered rudimentary, inexpensive telephone 
service not only in urban centers, where Bell was already well estab-
lished, but also in many rural regions that Bell had yet to tap. Inde-
pendent strongholds included St. Louis, Rochester, New York, and 
countless smaller cities in the South and Midwest. By 1907, non-Bell 
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firms operated half of the telephones in the United States (see table 
3-5)-
The independents greatly expanded the market for telephony and 
forced Bell to extend its network at an unprecedented rate. In 1891, 
several years prior to the expiration of the Bell patents, fewer than 
four of every 1,000 Americans had a telephone. By 1910, fifteen years 
after the rise of the independents, the number of telephones had in-
creased to 82 per 1,000 Americans (see table 3.6). In the period between 
1894 and 1914—the first two decades of competition—Bell installed 
ten times as many telephones as it had in the period between 1876 and 
1893. 
Though the independents provided little long-distance service, few 
customers cared. Far more important, at least initially, was their ability 
to offer low rates and a reasonable level of service. In large measure, 
the ability of these firms to underbid Bell can be explained by the 
simple fact that, on account of their relatively small subscriber base 
(compared to Bell), they had little need to make a comparable invest-
ment in switching technology. This was because in telephony, in con-
trast to mass-production industries such as steel or automobiles, ex-
panding the scale of operations led to an increase, rather than a 
decrease, in unit cost. The larger the number of subscribers, the greater 
the problem. Or, to put it somewhat less abstractly, as the network 
expanded, it became relatively more expensive to provide the necessary 
facilities to enable a user to make a call.84 
The rise of the independents forced Bell Telephone executives to 
Table 3.5 Telephone Usage Patterns, 1876-1920 
Telephone Calls3 
Number of Telephones 
Telephones" Per 1,000 Local Toll 
Year (thousands) Population (millions) (thousands) 
1876 3 0.1 n.a. n.a. 
1880 54 1.1 0.2 2 
1890 234 3.7 1.4" 10" 
1893 266 3.9 1.9 34 
1900 1,356 17.6 7.7 193 
1910 7,635 82.0 35.3 862 
1920 13,273 123.4 50.2 1,607 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, 2:783-784. 
'Bell System and independent companies. 
"Totals for 1889. 
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Table 3.6 Competition in Telephony, 1893-1920 












1893 0.3 0 0 100 0 
1900 0.8 0.02 0.5 63 37 
1905 2.3 0.3 1.6 61 39 
1907 3.0 0.8 2.3 63 37 
1910 3.9 2.0 1.8 77 23 
1912 4.8 2.5 1.4 84 16 
1920 8.7 3.8 0.7 95 5 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, 2:783-784. 
rethink their business strategy. Following the lead of E. J. Hall, a key 
figure in Bell's expansion in the South, they entered into a variety of 
sublicensing agreements with firms that remained outside of their di-
rect control. Sublicensing proved particularly advantageous in periph-
eral regions like the South, because it enabled Bell to expand its net-
work at a minimum cost.85 Unlike the Bell operating companies, the 
sublicensees lacked direct financial ties to the parent company, yet they 
could interconnect with the Bell network, provided that they main-
tained certain technical standards. 
Hall also cultivated support for high technical standards among sym-
pathetic government officials, particularly in state legislatures and state 
regulatory commissions. Hall's skillful political entrepreneurship sig-
nificantly raised barriers to entry in the industry, since it obliged Bell's 
competitors to meet its exacting operating requirements. Just as the 
judiciary had shielded Bell from competition between 1876 and 1894, 
so the state governments helped it fend off potential challengers be-
tween 1894 and World War I.86 
Bell strategy assumed a heightened coherence in 1907, when a New 
York banking consortium headed up by J. P. Morgan gained control 
of AT&T and appointed Vail to the presidency. Back in power, Vail 
picked up where he had left off two decades before. 
The cornerstone of Vail's business strategy was his commitment to 
universal service. Universal service for Vail was soaring ideal that, at 
times, assumed an almost Utopian cast. Like Bell and Hubbard, Vail 
had a visionary streak, and he was firmly convinced that, at some future 
Recasting the Information Infrastructure for the Industrial Age 101 
time, AT&T would provide a basic level of telephone service to every 
household in the country. This was, however, a highly unrealistic 
objective at a time when telephones could be found in fewer than 10 
percent of American households. In the interim, he aspired to the less 
ambitious, yet still quite challenging, goal of interconnecting every 
existing telephone controlled by Bell. To popularize interconnection, 
Vail launched a public relations campaign that was by far the largest 
effort of its kind to have ever been mounted by a U.S. corporation.87 
Its theme was "one system, one policy, universal service," which suc-
cinctly expressed Vail's vision of an integrated telephone network un-
der the supervision of AT&T. 
Vail's strategy was predicated upon a close working relationship with 
the New York investors under J. P. Morgan. In addition to providing 
AT&T with the capital it needed to buy out selected independents, 
the Morgan group was determined to block the creation of an inde-
pendent long-distance network. Confident that AT&T could always 
outspend the competition, Vail followed Hall's lead and encouraged 
state legislatures and state regulatory commissions to mandate high 
technical standards for telephone firms operating within their jurisdic-
tions—establishing, by no means inadvertently, barriers that the more 
poorly capitalized independents found difficult to meet.88 
One area in which Vail proved unwilling to innovate was in switch-
ing. Though AT&T's competitors had begun in the 1890s to introduce 
automatic switching, before 1920 virtually every telephone call made 
with Bell equipment had been connected manually by a telephone 
operator—almost always a young woman known as a "hello girl." Vail 
was reluctant to move ahead in this area for several reasons. AT&T 
had a huge investment in mechanical switching equipment and Vail 
was understandably hesitant to write it off as obsolete. Technical chal-
lenges also loomed large. Automatic switching raised a host of per-
plexing operational problems, especially in a network as large as the 
Bell System. Still, had Vail made automatic switching a priority, it 
seems likely that AT&T could have moved a good deal faster in this 
area than it did (see figure 3.6). 
Vail's business outlook posed a further constraint. Automatic switch-
ing violated the principle of "user transparency"—that is, the notion 
that telephony should be kept so simple that subscribers would not 
even have to dial a number. Like Hubbard and Bell, Vail remained 
sensitive to the fact that most telephone subscribers hailed from the 
middle or upper classes and had come to regard telephone operators 
as a logical extension of their household staff. The decision to use the 
telephone—or so Vail assumed—should be analogous to ringing a maid 
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Figure 3.6 Telephone Operators. This is a very early photograph of telephone oper-
ators, dating from 1883. Taken in Boston, it shows men and women working together 
at a switchboard. The operators connected calls by attaching the caller's line to the 
appropriate slot in the plugboard that is mounted against the wall. Within a few 
years, this job would be reserved for women, the famous "hello girls." Automatic 
telephone switching became commonplace in the 1920s, after having been long 
resisted by AT&T. AT&T executives worried that customers would resent having to 
dial calls themselves; they also sought to protect the firm's enormous investment in 
manual switching equipment. Courtesy of AT&T Archives. 
to hand-deliver a personal note. "The telephone operator," Vail de-
clared, was the "servant of every subscriber, as though she was in his 
office or in his direct employ. . . . There can never be, in my opinion, 
any way devised to get rid of the 'intelligence' which at some point in 
making up the connection is apt to be required."89 Not until the 1920s, 
with the widespread introduction of the dial telephone, would Bell 
democratize telephony by permitting subscribers to hold a telephone 
conversation without having to rely on the assistance of a Bell System 
operator to complete the connection.90 
Vail proved far more committed to solving the problem of long-
distance telephony. Though the market for long-distance service re-
mained quite limited, Vail was driven by what one historian has aptly 
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termed an "almost irrational commitment" to interconnection.91 The 
invention by Bell engineers in the 1880s of the loading coil and in the 
1900s of the audion (an early vacuum tube) were major steps toward 
the realization of this goal. So was the advent, in 1915, of telephone 
service between New York and San Francisco, which demonstrated 
for the first time the feasibility of telephony on a truly continental 
scale. 
The New York-San Francisco connection was a major technical 
triumph, since it had required the use of the audion, one of the key 
innovations of the Information Age. In the following years, AT&T 
built on this breakthrough by experimenting with the audion in wire-
less telegraphy, or what would soon come to be known as radio. 
AT&T's foray into the new technology was short-lived. Fearful of 
possible legal action under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Bell pulled 
out of radio as a precaution. This decision drew on a certain fund of 
experience—in the years preceding World War I, AT&T had found 
itself embroiled in a related lawsuit aimed at contesting its control over 
the telephone business. This legal action was abandoned in 1913, when, 
to the surprise of many observers, AT&T Vice President Nathan 
Kingsbury and U.S. Attorney General James C. McReynolds devised 
an out-of-court settlement that made major concessions to the inde-
pendents. Had McReynolds and Kingsbury failed to work out the 
compromise that became known as the Kingsbury Commitment, the 
Bell System might well have been broken up or even nationalized. 
The Kingsbury Commitment required Bell to provide access to its 
long-distance lines to independents that sought such a connection; the 
settlement also promulgated a set of principles that would structure 
relations between AT&T, the operating companies, and the independ-
ents for more than seventy years—until the court-mandated breakup 
of the Bell System in 1984. 
Given the present-day deregulatory climate, one might assume that 
the Kingsbury Commitment was a clear victory for monopoly over 
competition. After all, it weakened the independents, and left the Bell 
System intact. Yet this was not how it was commonly understood at 
the time. Far more important to contemporaries was the role of this 
agreement in defusing pressure for the nationalization of the entire 
telephone industry—which was, as one popular magazinist aptly ob-
served, one of the "big, smoldering issues" of the day.92 Government 
ownership of telephony was an established fact in Great Britain, 
France, and every other major industrial country; in the 1910s, such 
ownership had the support of many U.S. public figures, including 
Postmaster General Albert Burleson. In such a political setting, the 
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independents quite understandably supported the Kingsbury Com-
mitment as the lesser of two evils. Indeed, one historian of the inde-
pendents has gone so far as to credit the endorsement of the agreement 
by these firms as a major reason the industry escaped the evil of 
government ownership. "It is fair to say," this historian observed, that 
if the Kingsbury Commitment had not "broken the ice" and convinced 
both the independents and AT&T that they had an equal stake in the 
status quo, the "public ownership zealots" in Washington might have 
been able to "put over" on a "disunited and internally bickering in-
dustry" a much more intrusive regulatory scheme.93 
During World War I, the federal government did, in fact, briefly 
assume control of the telephone industry. Yet Congress proved dis-
inclined to perpetuate this experiment once the hostilities ceased, and 
in 1919 it swiftly returned the industry to its investors. It may well be 
that this outcome owed more than a little to the collective ability of 
AT&T, the government, and the independents to devise a politically 
acceptable regulatory regime. 
Vail's business strategy proved so successful and enduring, that it is 
tempting to speculate a bit about the organizational models upon which 
he drew. One possible source of inspiration was, of course, the tele-
graph industry. Vail had briefly worked for Western Union as a tele-
graph operator in his youth, and was familiar with the prominent role 
that his cousin, Alfred Vail, had played in the 1840s in helping Samuel 
F. B. Morse's to set up the Washington-Baltimore line. 
Yet the influence of telegraphy on Vail's managerial style is easily 
exaggerated. In several key respects, Vail's leadership of the Bell Sys-
tem differed from Orton's and Green's administration of Western 
Union. Unlike Vail, Orton and Green lacked a commitment to systems 
integration, opposed all forms of government control, and, with the 
exception of a brief moment in the 1860s and 1870s, displayed scant 
interest in technological innovation.94 
A far more plausible, though often overlooked, organizational seed-
bed for Vail's ideas was the Post Office Department. Ever since the 
passage of the Post Office Act of 1792, postal administrators had 
striven, in one way or another, to provide the citizenry with universal 
access to up-to-date information about commerce and public affairs. 
Though this goal differed in several ways from Vail's commitment to 
universal service, it did share with it an unambiguously civic cast. Even 
more direct were the lessons that Vail may have drawn from the 
Railway Mail Service, over which he had presided in the 1870s. Par-
ticularly suggestive was Vail's involvement in the Fast Mail. This 
project, after all, was a major experiment not only in high-speed long-
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distance transmission, but also in interconnection, technical standard-
setting, and the administrative coordination of a highly decentralized 
federation of operating units. Without wishing to push the analogy too 
far, it may well be that it furnished Vail with at least some of the ideas 
that he would later deploy with such effectiveness at AT&T. 
The Informational Environment of the 
Industrial Nation 
"What strikes and frightens the backward European almost as much 
as anything in the United States," declared one English visitor in 1912, 
is the "efficiency and fearful universality" of its telephone service: 
Just as I think of the big cities as agglomerations pierced everywhere 
by elevator-shafts full of movement, so I think of them as being 
threaded under pavements and over roofs and between floors and 
ceilings and between walls, by millions upon millions of live filaments. 
. . . the European telephone is a toy, and a somewhat clumsy one, 
compared with the inexorable seriousness of the American tele-
phone.95 
The Englishman's observation was borne out by comparative data. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, there was one telephone for every 
sixty individuals in the United States; one for every 115 individual in 
Sweden; and one for every 1,216 individuals in France.96 In 1909, there 
were more telephones in the hotels of New York City than in all of 
Spain.97 
Telephony shaped U.S. business in a variety of ways. By facilitating 
interpersonal communication within localities and inside buildings, it 
reduced the demand for messenger boys. And by providing senior-
level administrators with a tool for overseeing foremen, middle man-
agers, and other subordinates, it encouraged the physical separation of 
the factory floor from the executive suite, a necessary precondition for 
the emergence of the central office district. Bell engineer John J. Carty 
observed: "It may sound ridiculous" to hail Alexander Graham Bell 
and his successors as the "fathers of modern commercial architecture— 
of the skyscraper." Yet, Carty added, the relationship between tele-
phony and the multistory office building was impossible to ignore. 
"Suppose there was no telephone and every message had to be carried 
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by a personal messenger. How much room do you think the necessary 
elevators would leave for offices? Such structures would be an economic 
impossibility."98 
The emergence of the skyscraper significantly augmented the au-
thority of the central office. So did the novel requirement that sales 
representatives report back to headquarters every day when they were 
on the road. To meet this demand, hotel owners installed telephones 
in the guest rooms of establishments that catered to business travelers, 
an innovation that at this time distinguished U.S. hotels from their 
counterparts in the rest of the world. 
The speed with which the telephone transformed social relations 
within the firm is easily exaggerated. At no point did telephony entirely 
displace written communication, or render obsolete any of the other 
information-related technologies that were beginning to come into 
widespread use. In certain large firms—such as the Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company, in New York—the telephone faced stiff compe-
tition from pneumatic tubes, an ingenious mechanical delivery system 
that had the advantage of leaving a written record. In the late nine-
teenth century, Metropolitan employees within the firm's New York 
headquarters were transmitting pneumatically some 5,000 messages a 
day.99 
Executives sometimes tried to compensate for the absence of a writ-
ten record by mounting two phones on their desks—one for their own 
use, and one for their stenographer (see figure 3.7). Yet this expedient 
was awkward and expensive, and it rarely caught on. Outright resis-
tance to the new technology was by no means unknown, particularly 
when its introduction was unaccompanied by any related changes in 
organizational design. A manager of a medium-sized manufacturing 
firm in Connecticut in 1917 complained, "Time is lost, confusion 
results and money is spent in endeavoring to locate executives [for 
telephone calls] when they are out in the plant."100 
For many Americans—in particular, those in the middle and upper 
classes—the telephone provided a useful substitute for a face-to-face 
exchange, just as Bell and Hubbard had hoped. Storekeepers large and 
small quickly came to recognize it as an indispensable business asset. 
Telephony proved especially valuable for individuals whose cultural 
authority rested on technical expertise or verbal skill. This was partic-
ularly true of the lawyers, bankers, doctors, ministers, and civic leaders 
who made up such a vital part of the professional middle class. 
By World War I, many middle- and upper-class households had come 
to regard the telephone as a necessity. But it was hardly inexpensive. The 
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Figure 3.7 Office Telephone. By 1904, when this photograph was taken, telephones 
were a common feature in business offices. But, as this photograph reveals, some 
businessmen continued to prefer to mount them on separate tables, rather than on 
their desk. Note that the telephone has two transmitters. This made is possible for 
a stenographer to record the conversation. Telephone service quickly spread to 
private residences and, by the First World War, was widely available throughout the 
United States. Courtesy of AT&T Archives. 
average residential rate for a Bell telephone in 1895 was $4.66 a month, 
or $66 a year—which put it well out of the reach of the working 
poor.101 It is hard to come up with comparable totals for later decades, 
since Bell began to give households the option of choosing between 
metered service and a flat monthly rate. In addition, households could 
sometimes secure more inexpensive service from the independents, or 
by sharing a party line that enabled several families to share a single 
circuit. Long-distance telephony was especially expensive. In 1919, for 
example, it cost $16.50 to make a three-minute call between New York 
and San Francisco, and $4.65 to make a three-minute call between 
New York and Chicago.102 Not until well after World War II would it 
become at all common to make long-distance calls from one's home, 
and, as late as the 1930s, less than 2 percent of all telephone traffic 
crossed state lines.103 
Prior to the expiration of the Bell patent monopoly in 1894, few 
farms had telephones. With the rise of the independents, rural tele-
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phony was born. In 1903 less than 3 percent of farm households had 
telephones, at a time when the national household average was 10 
percent. By 1912, fully 30 percent of farm households had at least 
some form of telephone service, which was surprisingly close to the 
national average of 35 percent. For a time, the overwhelmingly rural 
state of Iowa had one of the highest rates of per capita telephone usage 
in the United States.104 
Many hoped that rural telephony would slow the migration of farm 
children from the country to the city. "With a telephone in the house, 
a buggy in the barn, and a rural mail box at the gate," predicted one 
rural booster, "the problem of how to keep the boys and girls on the 
farm is solved."105 The reality, however, was more complex. The tele-
phone notwithstanding, farm regions continued to lose population— 
and, between 1920 and 1940, the number of rural telephones users 
actually declined.106 Not until after World War II would rural telephone 
penetration once again approximate the national average. This upsurge 
owed less to private competition than to public policy—in particular, 
the government-mandated cross-subsidization of telephone service and 
the cheap loans and technical aid provided to thinly settled portions 
of the country by the Rural Electrification Authority. Just as political 
fiat had spurred the expansion of the information infrastructure in the 
commercial republic, so too would it continue to shape its development 
in the industrial nation. 
Summary 
This chapter reminds us that the prehistory of the present-day Infor-
mation Age antedates the invention of the computer by a century and 
a half, and, in fact, is older than the United States. Beginning in the 
1760s with the emergence of an organized opposition to the Crown, 
and accelerating in the 1790s with the expansion of the postal network, 
information has always figured prominently in American life. In con-
junction with the seemingly insatiable demand of Americans for more 
and better information, the transformation of the information infra-
structure during the long nineteenth century goes far toward explaining 
why a faith in the emancipatory potential of communications has long 
been one of the most distinctive, and enduring, of American cultural 
traits. 
Between the adoption of the Constitution and World War I, two 
distinct yet partly overlapping communications revolutions recast the 
informational environment in the United States. The first of these 
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revolutions received its initial impetus in the 1760s, when large num-
bers of Americans came for the first time to regard the creation of an 
informed citizenry as a valued ideal. This cultural imperative found 
an institutional embodiment in the postal system, which, after an un-
certain beginning in the 1770s and 1780s, acquired a discernibly mod-
ern form with the passage of the Post Office Act of 1792. 
The first communications revolution reoriented the informational 
environment of the commercial republic from the seaboard to the 
hinterland. No longer would the primary information flows be trans-
atlantic, as they had been in the informational ancien regime that 
existed prior to 1787. By 1828, a Trans-Appalachian, land-based in-
formational environment had come to supplement—though never al-
together to supersede—the Atlantic, maritime informational environ-
ment that had once yoked the United States to Great Britain. 
The second communications revolution recast the informational en-
vironment for the Industrial Age. This revolution began in the 1840s 
with the expansion of the railroad and the advent of the telegraph, and 
accelerated in the 1870s with the elaboration of the Railway Mail 
Service and the coming of the telephone. By World War I, this infor-
mation infrastructure was complete. In many ways, it would become 
the foundation of the information infrastructure of the present-day 
Information Age. 
This second communications revolution shaped the informational 
environment in a variety of ways. In its first, transitional phrase, it 
fostered major institutional innovations in commodity trading and 
news reporting and improved internal communications within business 
enterprises that operated on a geographically extended scale. In its 
second (and final) phase, it eased rural isolation and hastened the rise 
of the modern central office district and the professional middle class. 
The history of the information infrastructure in the United States 
cannot be fully understood by focusing exclusively on the interplay of 
technology and markets. No less important have been the cultural 
norms that decision-makers relied on to shape the course of events. 
The ideal of an informed citizenry inspired postal administrators such 
as John McLean; the ideology of private enterprise constrained tele-
graph officials such as William Orton and Norvin Green; and the ethos 
of universal service guided telephone executives such as Theodore N. 
Vail. Political considerations have also proved significant. Congres-
sional opposition stymied competition in mail delivery; the specter of 
government control narrowed time horizons at Western Union; and 
various kinds of government regulation have shaped the contours of 
the telephone grid. 
100 A Nation Transformed by Information 
While competition has often been a catalyst for change, it remains 
undeniable that the communications sector has been dominated for 
long periods by a relatively small number of large institutions—the 
Post Office Department, the Railway Mail Service, Western Union, 
and the Bell System. To a remarkable extent, it was these institutions— 
each a first mover in its respective realm—that, in conjunction with 
the constant demand of countless Americans for more and better in-
formation, best explains the transformation of the American informa-
tional environment in the long nineteenth century that began in 1787 
with the framing of the Constitution and closed in 1914 with the start 
of World War I. 
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